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Part I
Plan Sponsors and Retirement Income Risk
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Chapter 2
An Analysis of Investment Advice to
Retirement Plan Participants
Zvi Bodie
Around the world, the primary responsibility for providing an adequate
retirement income has been shifting from governments, employers, and
trade unions, to individuals. Pension plans are shifting from the defined
benefit form to defined contribution, in which plan participants must make
investment decisions. Evidence abounds that people consistently make
certain mistakes because of lack of knowledge, faulty logic, cognitive disson-
ance, and biased statistics. This chapter examines the quality of the online
investment education materials and advice offered at websites designed
specifically for people planning for retirement. The first section of the
chapter titled ‘‘Time Horizon and Risk Tolerance: The Trouble with Online
Advice’’ analyzes the content of these websites, and it concludes that much
of the advice offered there is misleading and potentially quite harmful. The
second section titled ‘‘Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution, and Indi-
vidual Choice’’ considers what might be done to improve the advice and to
develop better investment products.
While there are significant differences in the level of technical sophistic-
ation among the websites and optimization tools, their qualitative advice is
strikingly uniform.1 The educational materials at these websites generally
agree on the following set of principles for investing money earmarked for
retirement:2
• Investors should diversify their total portfolio across asset classes, and
the equity portion should be well-diversified across industries and
companies.
• The longer your time horizon, the more you should invest in equities.
Table 2-1 summarizes some of the key findings from an examination of
the major websites.3
Time Horizon and Risk Tolerance:
The Trouble with Online Advice
In Economic theory provides no necessary connection between a person’s
time horizon and his risk tolerance. Thus, one can have a horizon of 30 years
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TABLE 2-1 Retirement Investment Advice in Websites
Issue Quicken Smart
Money
mPower
(Money Central)
Financial
Engines
Does the fraction in stocks
automatically increase with
time horizon?
Yes Yes No No
Is there a risk-free (e.g. TIPS
or I-bonds) option?
No No No No
Is there any mention of
different stock market
forecasts of experts?
No No No No
Source: Author’s survey.
and be extremely averse to risk, or a horizon of 1 year and be very
tolerant of risk. Indeed, for utility functions that exhibit constant relative
AQ: Merton
1971 is not
listed
risk aversion (CRRA), Merton (1969, 1971) and Samuelson (1969) have
shown that the proportion of total wealth optimally held in risky assets is
the same regardless of age. Their models show that very risk-averse people
should choose to invest in such a way as to minimize the volatility of their
lifetime consumption flow. If a risk-free lifetime annuity is available, then
they should purchase it.
Stocks for the Long Run
Yet the standard advice offered by the financial services industry is that a
longer time horizon implies greater risk tolerance.4 For example, Smart-
Money University puts it this way:
Where to invest your retirement savings shouldn’t be that complicated. It depends
largely on a single factor: time. The more time you have before you plan to retire, the
more aggressively you should be invested in equities. If, as for many people, the stock
market makes you nervous, check out Time vs. Risk for an interactive demonstration
of why this simple axiom holds true in good times and bad. History shows quite
clearly that equities are your best long-term investment option.5
A popular rule of thumb says that the fraction of one’s portfolio to invest
in stocks should be 100 minus one’s age. Using this rule, 70 percent of one’s
investments should be in stocks if one is 30 years old; 30 percent should
be in stocks if one is 70. The reasoning behind this advice goes as follows:
stocks’ year-to-year volatility make them poor choices to finance short-term goals: For
example, stocks’ spectacular 1995 return of 37.6 percent (as measured by the S&P
500) compares with the low 1994 return of 1.3 percent. But, over longer periods of
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time, fluctuations like these have tended to settle down---as you can see in the chart.
Stock returns for twenty-year periods ranged from a low of about three percent to a
high of around 17 percent. Over thirty-year periods, stock returns narrowed, ranging
from 8.5 to 13.5 percent. That’s why, although investing in stocks is hardly risk-
free and past results certainly don’t guarantee future performance, their historical
pattern suggests that stocks may be an appropriate alternative for you to consider if
your goal is a longer-term one.6
Unfortunately, this reasoning is invalid, and it may also be dangerously
misleading. The apparent reduction in risk is a statistical illusion arising
from the fact that the measure of return used is an average compound rate.
As students of introductory statistics are taught, the dispersion of an n-year
average declines, as n grows.7 But the dispersion of the average compound
rate of return is not a relevant parameter for the purpose at hand. For a
person investing a lump sum now to have, say, $1 million in 30 years time,
the relevant parameter is not the dispersion of the annual rate of return,
but the dispersion of the value of the portfolio in 30 years. The dispersion
of long-term holdings does not fall with time.
This same mistake is often made in educational materials depicting the
trade off between risk and reward (the ‘‘efficient portfolio frontier’’) for
different time horizons. Using mean and standard deviation of average
compound rates of return, the slope of the curve gets steeper as the time
horizon lengthens, implying that equities are a better choice, the longer
one’s horizon. But this is because the expected annualized risk premium
remains fixed, while the annualized standard deviation declines: again,
a statistical illusion.8
The financial advice in the websites that report probability of success or
failure as their summary measure are also misleading, but in a more subtle
way. To see why, compare the probability of a shortfall with the cost of insuring
against a shortfall.9 A shortfall occurs if the value of a stock portfolio at
the horizon date is less than the value an investor would have received by
investing in safe bonds (e.g. Treasury bonds) maturing on that same date. If,
as history suggests, the expected average compound return on stocks exceeds
the risk-free rate of interest, it is indeed true that the probability of a shortfall
declines with the length of the investment time horizon (Figure 2-1). But
this fact does not have the favorable implications many investment advisers
think it has.
The Truth about the Risk of Stocks in the Long Run
The simple economic fact is that there is no ‘‘free lunch’’ for the long-
term investor in the risk-reward department. The probability of a shortfall
is a flawed measure of risk because it completely ignores the severity of the
financial loss should a shortfall occur.10 A measure that does take proper
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Figure 2-1. Probability of a shortfall. (Source: Author’s computations.)
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Figure 2-2. Cost of shortfall insurance. (Source: Author’s computations.)
account of both the likelihood and the severity of a potential shortfall is the
price an investor would have to pay to insure against it.
If stocks were truly less risky in the long run, then the cost of insuring
against earning less than the risk-free rate of interest should decline as the
length of the investment horizon increases. But reality is quite the opposite.
The structure of insurance against shortfall risk is effectively a put option
with maturity equal to the investment horizon and with a strike price set at
the forward price of the underlying stock portfolio.11 According to theory
and in actual practice, the put price representing the cost of insuring against
a shortfall increases as the investment horizon lengthens. (See Figure 2-2.)
This pattern is easily confirmed for maturities up to 3 years by inspection
of prices for exchange-traded puts on individual stocks and on broad stock-
index portfolios. The same result holds uniformly for proprietary pricing
models used by investment and commercial banks to assess their own cost for
longer-maturity puts that they sell over the counter. For very long maturity
puts, this cost ranges from one-third to a half of the value of the equity
portfolio to be insured and so there is typically little commercial interest.
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In short, the insurance cost, and hence the risk, of shortfall over long time
horizons is anything but small (see Bodie, 1995; LaChance and Mitchell,
Chapter 8, this volume).
The Importance of One’s Earnings Profile
Clearly the conventional reasoning linking age and equity investing is
fundamentally flawed, but there are good reasons for linking age and port-
folio mix. A critical, but often overlooked, determinant of optimal asset
allocation is the risk profile of the individual’s future labor income. Typ-
ically the ratio of future labor income to other assets (such as retirement
savings) is large when investors are young, and eventually it decreases as
they approach retirement.
If one’s future labor income is relatively secure, it might be optimal
to start out in the early years with a high proportion of one’s investment
portfolio in stocks, and decrease it over time as suggested by the conven-
tional wisdom. However, this conventional wisdom may not apply to those
who face substantial risk in their labor income: entrepreneurs or stock
brokers, for example, whose income is highly sensitive to stock market risk.
For such investors, their human capital already provides a large stock mar-
ket exposure and the opposite policy may be optimal, that is, to start out with
a relatively low fraction of the portfolio in stocks and increase it over time.12
The Conservative Investor
To assess the strength of the pro-equity bias at websites for retirement
plan participants, I performed a simple test by adopting the stance of an
ultraconservative investor to see if there was any mention of risk-free invest-
ments such as inflation-protected bonds. When asked questions designed
to elicit my risk tolerance, I answered them in such a way as to indic-
ate as little tolerance as possible for risk of any kind. In theory, the
financial advice should result in a portfolio designed to minimize the volat-
ility of my lifetime consumption. If all post-retirement consumption is to
be financed from accumulated savings, then the portfolio should consist
entirely of fixed-income securities denominated in units of the consumption
good.
Unfortunately, in none of the many models I tested did this ever turn
out to be the case. Instead, I was always advised to invest a substantial frac-
tion of my portfolio stocks (at least 30 percent). This was true even when
I notified the advice program that I was starting my retirement. As shown in
the next section, retirees who are drawing down their retirement savings to
finance their spending face special risks when they invest in equities.
The Situation of Retirees
Most websites emphasize the fact that people may live a long time after they
retire. The average male retiring at 65 can expect to live 19 more years,
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TABLE 2-2 Drawdown of Retirement Fund Assuming 10% Per Year
Rate of Return
Year Rate of Return
(%)
Amount in Fund
($)
Interest
Earned ($)
Amount
Withdrawn
1 10 1,000,000 100,000 117,460
2 10 982,540 98,254 117,460
3 10 963,335 96,333 117,460
4 10 942,209 94,221 117,460
5 10 918,970 91,897 117,460
6 10 893,407 89,341 117,460
7 10 865,288 86,529 117,460
8 10 834,358 83,436 117,460
9 10 800,334 80,033 117,460
10 10 762,907 76,291 117,460
11 10 721,739 72,174 117,460
12 10 676,453 67,645 117,460
13 10 626,638 62,664 117,460
14 10 571,843 57,184 117,460
15 10 511,567 51,157 117,460
16 10 445,264 44,526 117,460
17 10 372,331 37,233 117,460
18 10 292,105 29,210 117,460
19 10 203,856 20,386 117,460
20 10 106,781 10,678 117,460
21 0 0
Source: Author’s computations.
to age 84. The average woman retiring at age 65 can expect to live 23
more years, to age 88. Therefore, the reasoning goes, one should remain
substantially committed to stocks even after one retires.
This advice is especially problematic, however, because during retire-
ment one is drawing down one’s assets. The resultant standard of living
will depend not only on the average rate of return one earns during retire-
ment, but also on the time path of returns. Even if the average rate of return
is high, one can run out of money long before one expires. For example,
suppose one planned to save a total of $1 million, expecting to live for
20 years after retirement, and assume an average rate of return of 10 percent
per year.13 The annual retirement income to be withdrawn is calculated to
be $117,496 per year. Table 2-2 shows that by withdrawing this amount at the
end of each year, the original fund will be exhausted in precisely 20 years,
provided that one earns 10 percent in each and every year.
But suppose that the rate of return varied over the 20 years. Even if
the average is 10 percent per year, it makes a big difference whether
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TABLE 2-3 DrawDown of Retirement Fund When Rate
of Return during First 10 Years Is Zero
Year Rate of
Return
Amount in
Fund ($)
Interest
Earned ($)
Amount
withdrawn at
end of year ($)
1 0 1,000,000 0 117,460
2 0 882,540 0 117,460
3 0 765,081 0 117,460
4 0 647,621 0 117,460
5 0 530,162 0 117,460
6 0 412,702 0 117,460
7 0 295,242 0 117,460
8 0 177,783 0 117,460
9 0 60,323 0 117,460
10 0 −57,137 0 117,460
Source : Author’s computations.
the higher-than-average returns occur early or late in the 20-year span.
Suppose that during the first 10 years your rate of return is below aver-
age and during the last 10 years it is above average. One might not make
it past the 10th year. For example, suppose the rate of return is zero in the
first 10 years, and 20 percent per year in the last 10 years. Since the fund
would earn no interest at all during the first half of the period, one would
completely run out of money by the 9th year, as shown in Table 2-3 and in
Figure 2-3.
This is not merely a far-fetched hypothetical situation. Suppose that in
January 1973 a retiree had a fund of $1 million. The average rate of return
on a value-weighted portfolio of all stocks on the NYSE during the 20 years
starting in 1973 was a healthy 12.78 percent per year. Suppose the retiree
was conservative and assumed only a 10 percent rate of return, thus taking
out $117,460 each year. The pattern of actual annual returns and remaining
funds is shown in Table 2-4 and depicted in Figures 2-4 and 2-5.
Let’s take a detailed look at what could have happened. The stock market
declined 14.75 percent in 1973, so at the end of the year only $852,500 was
left. After taking out $117,460, only $735,040 was left. In 1974 the market
dropped another 26.5 percent, reducing the account balance to $540,990.
At the end of 1974, he again took out $117,460, leaving a new account
balance of $423,530. In other words, by the end of 1974, he had less than
half of the original $1,000,000 left, even though he only took out a total
of $234,920. In 1975 the market gained 37.2 percent, lifting his balance to
$581,337. After withdrawing $117,460, the balance was $463,878. In 1976
“chap02” — 2003/6/4 — page 26 — #10
26 Bodie
–100,000
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
900,000
1,000,000
1,100,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Year
A
m
ou
nt
 L
ef
t i
n 
F
un
d 
($
)
Constant 10% return
Zero then 20% return
Figure 2-3. How long will $1 million last? (Source: Author’s computations.)
TABLE 2-4 Actual Values for Retiree Starting in 1973
Year Rate of Return
(%)
Amount in
Fund ($)
Interest
Earned ($)
Amount Before
Withdrawal ($)
Amount
Withdrawn ($)
1973 −14.75 1,000,000 −147,500 852,500 117,460
1974 −26.40 735,040 −194,051 540,990 117,460
1975 37.26 423,530 157,807 581,337 117,460
1976 23.98 463,878 111,238 575,116 117,460
1977 −7.26 457,656 −33,226 424,430 117,460
1978 6.50 306,971 19,953 326,924 117,460
1979 18.77 209,464 39,316 248,780 117,460
1980 32.48 131,321 42,653 173,974 117,460
1981 −4.98 56,514 −2,814 53,700 117,460
1982 22.09 −63,760 −14,085 −77,844 117,460
Source: Author’s computations.
the market climbed 23.8 percent, raising the balance to $575,116, from
which he again took $117,460, leaving a balance of $457,656. The next year,
1977, was a bad year with a market return of −7.2 percent. The account
balance declined to $424,430, from which he withdrew $117,460, and so
on. By the time he reached 1981, he had only $56,514 left in the fund. That
year his return was −4.98 percent and he could no longer take out $117,460
to live on. Thus we see that even though on average from 1973 through 1992
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Figure 2-4. Rate of return on New York Stock Exchange. (Source: Wharton research
data services <http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu>.)
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Figure 2-5. Funds remaining for retiree who started withdrawing in 1973. (Source:
Author’s computations.)
the market returned a rate of return of 11.3 percent per year, and he had
been counting on only 10 percent per year, he ran out of money before the
10th year.
Matters would have been even worse for a retiree in Japan. The Japanese
market reached its peak in 1989, just over 40,000 on the Nikkei 225, its
major stock index. It then plunged to about 12,000, and despite temporary
recoveries, it has remained depressed ever since.
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Differences of Opinion among Expert Forecasters
How will the US stock market perform over the next 10 years? Even the
experts cannot agree. The New York Times (September 2, 2001) repor-
ted that Robert Shiller and Jeremy Siegel, two finance professors who
specialize in analyzing the stock market, had strikingly different market
forecasts. Shiller argued that the US stock market was vastly overvalued, and
he predicted generally poor performance until share prices realign them-
selves with ‘‘fundamental’’ values. Siegel disagreed. If the experts cannot
even agree about the mean rate of return on stocks over the next decade,
then it is reasonable to conclude that even a well-diversified stock portfolio
is a risky investment.
Another piece of conventional wisdom holds that one should invest in
stocks because they are a good hedge against inflation. In fact, the evidence
is that stocks are not a good hedge against inflation. The decade of the
1970s was the only prolonged period in the past century when the United
States experienced significant inflation, and that is precisely the period when
stocks did poorly.14
Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution, and
Individual Choice
One institutional response to the difficulties faced by ordinary people in
managing their own retirement funds has been defined benefit (DB) pen-
sion plans. In a typical DB plan for salaried employees, those who work
for the organization sponsoring the plan over their whole careers receive
a guaranteed life annuity that replaces 60--70 percent of final salary.15
The employee ‘‘pays’’ for this annuity by working for the organization for
a certain minimum number of years. Plan participants do not worry about
the risk of a shortfall, since this is the concern of the sponsor and in the
United States, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).16
But traditional DB pension plans have been on the decline in the United
States, eclipsed by cash-balance plans and defined contribution (DC) plans,
which transfers the risk to those who may be least qualified to manage it.17
For the average participant in an employer-sponsored plan, the switch to
self-directed pension plans might therefore cause a decline in welfare, even
when offset by other benefits of greater monetary value.
The tendency in the last several years has been to offer participants in self-
directed retirement plans more and more investment options. Economists
generally believe that people are made better off when offered more choices,
as long as they can always choose what they had before.18 But if people do
not have the knowledge to make choices that are in their own best interests,
increasing the number of choices may not necessarily make them better off.
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In fact, it could make them more vulnerable to exploitation by opportunistic
salespeople or by well-intentioned, but unqualified, professionals.
An analogy with medical care may clarify this point. Most of us look to phys-
icians and other medical professionals to guide our choices about health
maintenance practices and treatments for illnesses. We would probably not
be better off if the number of alternatives increased without our under-
standing enough about them to make rational choices. Like surgery, asset
allocation is a complex procedure, requiring much knowledge and years
of training. No one would imagine that patients could perform surgery to
remove their own appendices after reading an explanation in a brochure
published by a surgical equipment company. Yet prevailing practice seems
to expect employees to choose an appropriate mix of stocks, bonds, and
cash after reading a brochure published by an investment company. Some
of them are likely to make serious mistakes, and the educational materials
distributed to retirement plan participants by financial service firms con-
firms these fears. Participants are led to believe that stocks are not risky in
the long run. Online asset allocation tools are heavily biased toward equity
investment. Rarely is mention made of truly safe long-term investments,
such as government inflation-protected bonds and real annuities.
Protection Against a Market Decline
Starting with the emergence of exchange-traded options and the discovery
of the option pricing model in 1973, a variety of financial service firms have
been selling investment products that offer protection against a stock market
decline.19 In Germany it seems likely that insured equity-linked retirement
saving products will become the norm, as a result of the pension reform
legislation passed in 2001. A key feature of Germany’s pension reform is
that to qualify for state subsidies, all savings vehicles must carry a guarantee
of principal.20
Escalating Life Annuities
The modern theory of contingent claims analysis provides the framework
for the production and pricing of new and improved retirement income
products with protection against both market declines and the risk of out-
living one’s resources.21 Let me illustrate using the example of a class of
contracts that I call ‘‘escalating annuities.’’22
Traditional annuities in the United States, including those provided by DB
plans have a glaring defect: they are not protected against inflation. Today
it is possible for financial intermediaries to efficiently produce annuities
that are protected fully or partially against inflation by hedging the liability
with inflation-protected government bonds.23 Moreover, they can also be
combined with upside participation in the performance of various stock
market indexes. As an example, consider an escalating life annuity with
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a minimum benefit linked to the cost of living. Payments increase with
inflation and with the performance of a market index, and increases are
locked in for life.
Escalating annuities are designed to provide a guaranteed minimum
standard of living defined in terms of a flow of lifetime consumption (rather
than a stock of wealth). They allow retirees to gradually increase their
consumption if the stock market performs well without jeopardizing the
standard of living to which they have become accustomed. Note that this
is very different from a variable annuity benefit, which can either go up or
down over time depending on market performance.
To make the example more concrete, let us assume that a typical customer
reaches age 65 with $1 million in his self-directed retirement account.
He seeks to retire and live off his income from Social Security (say $15,000
per year) and the income generated by his $1 million retirement account.
How would a hypothetical escalating life annuity work? One simple design
would be to allow the annuitant to choose the fraction of his $1 million
that would go into the guaranteed real annuity. Assume he chooses
90 percent, and that this establishes a guaranteed real floor of $55,000 per
year.24 Together with his Social Security income, this gives him a real income
floor of $70,000 per year. The other $100,000 in his retirement account
would be invested in equities or equity derivatives to produce growth in
real income. Each year part of this risky fund would be used to purchase
additional guaranteed real annuity income.25
The upside leverage of the escalating annuity could be increased by invest-
ing the $100,000 at risk in a series of equity call options maturing in each of
the next 10 years. If on the annual expiration date, the call is in the money,
then the proceeds are used to increase the guaranteed income floor. If it is
out of the money, the floor remains unchanged for another year.
Currently, exchange-traded options have maturities as long as 3 years.
Firms that sell structured equity participation securities have issued notes
with maturities of 10 years. It is not hard to imagine that innovative firms
might issue even longer-dated index call options over the counter.
Conclusions
Increasingly, the complex problem of investing so as to provide a secure
retirement income is being transferred from governmental institutions
and private sector employers to people who lack the knowledge and the
training to handle the risk. As we have seen, the educational materials
and investment advice provided to those people by financial service firms
is often dangerously misleading. One practical solution to the dangers posed
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for individuals and for society at large is to design and produce a new gen-
eration of investment products that insure people against severe market
declines. Advances in the science of finance and market innovations over
the past several decades have made this a feasible task.
Notes
1A major distinction is between websites that give advice in terms of from three
to five generic asset categories and those that give more specific recommendations
based upon the user’s actual holdings. Some use a Markowitz efficient portfolio fron-
tier analysis. The more sophisticated websites, such as Financial Engines or mPower,
simulate probability distributions of retirement wealth or retirement income.
2See Bodie and Crane (1997) for a more complete statement of generally accepted
investment principles. Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) report a similar finding.
3My survey was done during the month of December 2001.
4Financial Engines was the only exception.
5See <http://university.smartmoney.com/Departments/Investing101/RiskvsReward/
index.cfm?story=timevsrisk>.
6Taken from TIAA-CREF ‘‘Principles of Sound Investing.’’
7The variance of the annualized rate of return declines with the length of the holding
period as long as there is no perfect positive serial correlation in stock returns. Empir-
ically stock returns exhibit either no serial correlation or negative serial correlation.
See in Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2002), pp. 254--256
8See Merton (1992) for a demonstration that characterizing rates of return solely in
terms of mean and variance is valid only when the time interval is extremely short
and there are no big ‘‘jumps.’’
9See Bodie (1995).
10The term severity as used here is meant to capture not just the magnitude of a
shortfall but also its weight in terms of its Arrow-Debreu state-claim price. For a
detailed discussion of this point see Bodie (2002).
11Bodie (1995).
12See Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992).
13This example is taken from Bodie and Clowes (2003).
14See Bodie (1976).
15The employer-provided benefit is typically integrated with Social Security benefits,
and the combination of the two replaces roughly 70 percent of earnings only for
those at the bottom of the income scale.
16This guarantee is capped by the PBGC. Above the cap, the employee is at risk of
default by the plan sponsor. For plans terminated in 2001, the cap was $40,704.60
per year. It is adjusted annually.
17The AFL-CIO writes: ‘‘Defined benefit plans remain the best and sound-
est vehicles for building and safeguarding retirement income and security.’’
<www.aflcio.org/publ/estatements/feb2002/governance.htm>.
18But even economists acknowledge that there are exceptions, for example, when
people have problems with self-control. Offering a shot of whiskey to a recovering
alcoholic does not increase his welfare.
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32 Bodie
19For a discussion of such products, see Bodie and Crane (1999) and Maurer and
Schlag (Chapter 9 this volume).
20Deutsche Bank has already structured principal-guaranteed transactions of funds
and mixed equity, and fixed-income portfolios. <www.risk.net/investor/archive/
oct01/pension.htm>.
21For a discussion of the many other risks of old age that can be addressed with
innovative financial products, see Bodie, Hammond, and Mitchell (2002).
AQ: This
ref. is not
cited 22Dybvig (1995) uses the term ‘‘ratcheting’’ to describe this time-pattern of con-
sumption.
23See Bodie (1990, 1997).
24This is an approximation based on quoted rates on Lincoln National Life’s
Inflation-Proofer annuity.
25I am assuming that the worker has no bequest motive.
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